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Abstract
We introduce trustworthy traders in bilateral trading. Trustworthy traders do not
misrepresent their private information. We prove that an increase in the levels of
trust (probabilities that traders are trustworthy) can reduce the maximum attainable
probability of trade among the strategic traders in the set of k-double auctions. In
contrast, if the levels of trust increase, then we can construct direct mechanisms with
a higher probability of trade among the strategic traders. In fact, there exist ex-
post efficient direct mechanisms if the levels of trust are high but k-double auctions
are inefficient for all levels of trust. We prove that k-double auctions are constraint-
inefficient for generic levels of trust when players have uniform priors.
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1 Introduction
Experiments have documented departures from the paradigm of Homo Economicus, leading
economists to acknowledge the existence of non-strategic or behavioral-type players. This
has generated a line of inquiry into the “incentives” for the survival of behavioral-type
players. However, economists have rightly not jettisoned Homo Economicus for good; after
all, humans have the ability to comprehend and reason. Studying the implications of strategic
behavior while simultaneously acknowledging the existence of behavioral types points to
another line of inquiry that we can pursue: how is the behavior of the strategic-type players
affected by the possibility of interacting with the behavioral-type players? With such a
motivation, we introduce trustworthy-type traders in bilateral trading and study the level of
efficiency attained by the strategic-type traders when they are uncertain about each others
trustworthiness.
Trust, a belief in the trustworthiness of others, is a crucial factor in all economic interac-
tions that take place when there is incomplete information.1 This is also true of bargaining
because private information of individuals, which is mostly not verifiable (e.g., valuation of
an object), makes the gains that can be achieved through negotiations uncertain. In such
circumstances, there exist opportunities for individuals to mislead others, for instance, by
making false claims (“Certainly I cannot accept this offer, it costs me more than that!”).
Such misrepresentations, indeed even the existence of the opportunity to misrepresent, have
been proved to generate inefficiencies in economic interactions – [2, 15]. However, a simple
introspection would prove that most of us do not believe that this world is inhabited by
cheaters; after all, we all have at one point or other met someone who is trustworthy, a
person who can “....be relied on as honest, truthful, or reliable.”2
1Hardin [8] stresses the relationship between trust and trustworthiness of an individual. Dasgupta [4]
and Gambetta [6] define trust as a belief over actions of others. Good [7] says that trust is based on claims
made by individuals.
2Pearsall [16, pg. 1540].
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We consider the bilateral trading problem in which a buyer and a seller of an indivisible
object engage in a trading mechanism that determines whether they trade and at what price.
Each player is privately informed about her valuation for the object but does not know the
valuation of the other player; she only knows the latter’s distribution. Moreover, each player
can be of either trustworthy disposition or strategic disposition. A player privately knows
her disposition but does not know the disposition of the other player. The buyer believes
that the seller is trustworthy type with probability s while the seller believes that the buyer
is trustworthy type with probability b. These probabilities reflect the levels of trust in the
trading problem. We study how the levels of trust affects the probability of trade among the
strategic types in two sets of trading mechanisms, the set of direct mechanisms and the set
of k-double auctions.3
In context of the trading problem studied here, a player is trustworthy type if she does
not cause any strategic impediment to trade by manipulating her private information. In a
direct mechanism, players are required to submit reports about their respective types. For a
direct mechanism, we assume that the trustworthy-type player reports her type truthfully. It
must be emphasized that since the type of a player has two components, valuation type and
disposition type, the trustworthy-type player will truthfully report both these components.
A k-double auction is another trading mechanism that has been extensively studied both
theoretically and experimentally due to its similarity to real world bargaining procedures.4
In the k-double auction, players simultaneously submit sealed bids and trade takes place if
and only if the buyer’s bid exceeds the seller’s bid at a price equal to the weighted average of
the two bids with the weight of k on the buyer’s bid. For this trading mechanism, we assume
that the trustworthy-type player bids truthfully, that is, she bids equal to her valuation.5
3None of the results will change if we were to instead study the effect of the levels of trust on the ex-ante
gains from trade obtained in the event that both players are strategic type.
4For theoretical analysis see Chatterjee and Samuelson [3], Farrell and Gibbons [5], Mathews and Postle-
waite [12], Leininger et al. [11] and Satterthwaite and Williams [19]. Radner and Schotter [17], Valley et al.
[21] and McGinn et al. [13] conduct experiments on the k-double auction.
5It could be argued that naming these traders honest or truth-telling type would better reflect the
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In fact, these assumptions about the trustworthy types are motivated by the behavior of
players observed in experiments on 1
2
-double auctions conducted by Valley et al. [21] and
McGinn et al. [13].6
A common perception is that trust among individuals involved in any interaction is
better for their welfare. We challenge this perception by proving that higher levels of trust
can reduce the probability of trade among the strategic-type traders in the set of k-double
auctions. To be precise, we consider a bilateral trading problem in which the valuations are
distributed uniformly and independently on [0, 1]. We prove that if the levels of trust are
positive, then the probability of trade among the strategic-type traders in any equilibrium
outcome of any k-double auction is strictly less than the maximum probability of trade that
can be achieved in the set of k-double auctions when the traders completely distrust each
other. Intuitively, the strategic types try to capitalize on the trustworthy types’ honesty by
bidding “tougher” so that the strategic-type buyer bids lower and the strategic-type seller
bids higher “on average”—the proof does not rely on this intuition though. Hence, any
mediator/mechanism designer whose goal is to maximize the probability of trade among the
strategic types will be strictly “worse-off” if the players trust each other and this is true even
if she could choose any trading mechanism for the players from the set of k-double auctions.
This result suggests that trust need not always be welfare improving.
Fortunately, such negative consequences of trust can be completely eliminated by de-
signing “correct” mechanisms. In the statement of the above mentioned negative result, we
assumptions that we make about their behavior in the two mechanisms. Such a name would imply that
these traders have some psychological or moral bias for telling the truth. However, there could be other
reasons for the players to not manipulate their private information. For instance, Saran and Serrano [18]
provide an evolutionary explanation of truthful bidding in k-double auctions which is because of the presence
of a friction to change one’s bid. Moreover, we do not assume that the trustworthy-type traders bid truthfully
in the k-double auction when they are allowed to communicate before bargaining (see Assumption 4.6).
6For instance, McGinn et al. [13] find over 50% of individual communications in which players revealed
their valuation types truthfully when they were allowed to communicate before bargaining. McGinn et al.
[13] also find players bidding truthfully both when allowed to communicate (30% of individual bids) and
when not allowed to communicate (44% of individual bids) before the double auction.
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restricted ourselves to the set of k-double auctions, which is a subset of the set of direct
mechanisms since the revelation principle still holds. We prove that if we can use direct
mechanisms, then for all bilateral trading problems, any increase in the levels of trust is
weakly better. This is because we can design new incentive compatible and individually
rational direct mechanisms with at least as high probability of trade among the strategic
types as before.7 Thus, more flexibility of design available in the set of direct mechanisms
compared to that in the set of k-double auctions can be used to create incentives for the
strategic types so that any increase in the levels of trust weakly improves the efficiency
attained by them.
By juxtaposing these results for the sets of k-double auctions and direct mechanisms,
we conclude that k-double auctions are constraint-inefficient for generic levels of trust in
the bilateral trading problem with uniform priors on the valuation type. Myerson and
Satterthwaite [15] prove that if both the players are only strategic type, then a 1
2
-double
auction is constraint-efficient in the bilateral trading problem with uniform priors. Hence,
the constraint-efficiency of the set of k-double auctions is not robust to perturbations in the
disposition type of the players.8
The positive influence of the levels of trust on the efficiency of trade among the strategic
types in the set of direct mechanisms prompts an inquiry into the “limit” of this positive
effect, that is, can we achieve ex-post efficiency in the set of direct mechanisms? The answer is
yes. For any bilateral trading problem, there exist ex-post efficient, incentive compatible and
individually rational direct mechanisms if and only if at least one player has high enough
trust in the other player.9 In contrast, Myerson and Satterthwaite [15] prove that if the
7Incentive compatibility for the trustworthy types is trivially satisfied since they report truthfully. Also,
by individual rationality we mean interim individual rationality.
8In a similar vein, Satterthwaite and Williams [19] prove that if the players are only strategic type, then
the constraint-efficiency of the set of k-double auctions is not robust to perturbations in the distributions of
the players’ valuations.
9Ex-post efficiency is attained not only in the event that both players are strategic type but in any
realization of disposition types.
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players are only strategic type, then for all bilateral trading problems, there do not exist
ex-post efficient mechanisms that are also incentive compatible and individually rational.
Thus, relaxation of the incentive compatibility constraints for a substantial “proportion of
the population” implied by a high enough probability of trustworthy types has important
implications for efficiency. We also show that trust among the players is substitutable, that
is, the more one player trusts the other, the less the latter needs to trust the former in order
to attain ex-post efficiency using an incentive compatible and individually rational direct
mechanism.
To understand the intuition behind this result, note that the trustworthy types do not
impose any “cost” of eliciting private information on the mechanism and more importantly,
generate positive ex-ante gains from trade by being truthful in communicating their type. If
one player has high enough trust in the other player, the “cost” of eliciting private information
from the strategic types is less than the ex-ante gains from trade generated by the trustworthy
types in any ex-post efficient mechanism. When this happens, we can construct ex-post
efficient direct mechanisms that induce the strategic types to both reveal their type truthfully
and voluntarily participate in the mechanism. This is done by providing enough subsidy to
the strategic types through lump-sum transfers of the ex-ante gains from trade generated by
the trustworthy types. The amount transferred from the trustworthy types is equal to the
gains generated by them and therefore, the trustworthy types also satisfy their individual
rationality constraints.
k-double auctions, however, are shown to be inefficient for all positive levels of trust
(except when at least one player is for sure trustworthy type). In k-double auctions, the
trustworthy types bid truthfully and hence do not impose any “cost” of eliciting private
information. However, the pricing rule of k-double auctions does not ensure that enough
subsidy is provided to the strategic types. Since trade takes place at a weighted average
of the two bids, the trustworthy types are able to retain ample gains from trade that are
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generated by them. Even any form of communication between the players before they play
any k-double auction will be fruitless in getting ex-post efficiency. As long as the trustworthy
types bid “rationally” (that is, the trustworthy type of the buyer (seller) bids at most (at
least) her valuation), any k-double auction with any form of pre-play communication will
be unable to produce adequate amount of subsidy for the strategic types and thus remain
ex-post inefficient.
The fact that we can get ex-post efficiency using direct mechanisms but not k-double
auctions shows the importance of designing correct transfer payments from the trustworthy
types to the strategic types in order to induce the latter to reveal their private information,
which can be done by using direct mechanisms but not k-double auctions. The real world
trading mechanisms like k-double auctions are thus not well designed from the perspective
of achieving efficiency by adequately capitalizing on the trust among players.
This paper is related to the literature on reputation beginning with the seminal papers of
Kreps et al. [9], Kreps and Wilson [10] and Milgrom and Roberts [14]. Sobel [20] studies the
effect of introducing a honest-type sender in a model of strategic information transmission
and Dasgupta [4] studies the influence of a honest-type salesman in the market for lemons.
Abreu and Gul [1] study the effect of adding a behavioral type, who is obstinate in its
demands and offers, on bargaining outcomes. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that this
paper does not focus on the issue of the strategic-type players building a reputation of being
trustworthy type in a repeated interaction.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the bilateral trading problem and
the assumptions about the trustworthy disposition. Subsection 2.1 provides the necessary
conditions for a trading mechanism to satisfy incentive compatibility and individual rational-
ity. Subsection 2.2 lists the sufficient conditions for a direct mechanism to satisfy incentive
compatibility and individual rationality. Section 3 shows how an increase in the levels of
trust can reduce efficiency in the set of k-double auctions but can be used to improve effi-
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ciency in the set of direct mechanisms. Section 4 shows that it is possible to attain ex-post
efficiency using direct mechanisms if the levels of trust are high enough but this is impossible
if we restrict ourselves to the set k-double auctions with or without any form of pre-play
communication. Then we conclude and in the final section present the proofs of the results.
2 Bilateral Trading Problem
A buyer (denoted by b) and a seller (denoted by s) engage in a trading mechanism to trade an
indivisible good. Each player i, where i = b, s, can have two possible dispositions (di), trust-
worthy (tr) and strategic (st). The probability that player i is trustworthy type is i, which
is independent of the other player’s valuation and disposition. Valuations of the strategic
and trustworthy types of the buyer are distributed on some interval [ab, a¯b] independently of
the seller’s valuation and disposition. Valuations of the strategic and trustworthy types of
the seller are distributed on [as, a¯s] independently of the buyer’s valuation and disposition.
Let Fdi , i = b, s & di = tr, st, be the distributions of valuations. The associated density
functions fdi are continuous and positive on their respective domains. Players know only
their own type (vi, di). All other information is common knowledge. (i, Fsti , Ftri)i=b,s defines
a bilateral trading problem. We term b and s as the levels of trust.
Trustworthy types do not misrepresent their private information in ways that is detri-
mental to trade. But that does not mean that they are “irrational” in the sense that they
are willing to participate in a trading mechanism even if their expected payoff is less than
their outside option (opportunity cost of participation), which for convenience is equal to 0
for all types of all players. This motivates the following assumptions about the trustworthy
types.
Assumption 2.1. Assumptions about Trustworthy Types:
1. A trustworthy type answers truthfully whenever she is asked to about her type (valu-
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ation or disposition).
2. Consider a trading mechanism in which players have to submit sealed bids for the
object. A trustworthy type bids equal to her valuation if she has not entered into an
agreement with the other player prior to submitting her bid.
3. A trustworthy type voluntarily participates in a trading mechanism only if her expected
payoff from participation is non-negative.
A consequence of the first assumption is that in a direct trading mechanism in which
players are asked to report their respective types, the trustworthy-type player will report her
type truthfully. The second assumption implies that in a k-double auction, the trustworthy
type bids equal to her valuation. Shading by the buyer or exaggeration by the seller is a
misrepresentation of her private information and reduces the likelihood of trade. Finally, the
last assumption above implies individual rationality for the trustworthy types.
An outcome of a trading mechanism is an allocation rule that specifies the following for
all pairs of valuation types (vb, vs):
1. Probability of trade:
• if both players are strategic, p(st,st)(vb, vs).
• if only the buyer is strategic, p(st,tr)(vb, vs).
• if only the seller is strategic, p(tr,st)(vb, vs).
• if both players are trustworthy, p(tr,tr)(vb, vs).
2. Payment from the buyer to the seller:
• if both players are strategic, x(st,st)(vb, vs).
• if only the buyer is strategic, x(st,tr)(vb, vs).
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• if only the seller is strategic, x(tr,st)(vb, vs).
• if both players are trustworthy, x(tr,tr)(vb, vs).
Define the following for all types (vi, di),
10
p¯(b,db)(vb) ≡ (1− s)
∫
[as,a¯s]
p(db,st)(vb, vs)fstsdvs + s
∫
[as,a¯s]
p(db,tr)(vb, vs)ftrsdvs
p¯(s,ds)(vs) ≡ (1− b)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
p(st,ds)(vb, vs)fstbdvb + b
∫
[ab,a¯b]
p(tr,ds)(vb, vs)ftrbdvb
x¯(b,db)(vb) ≡ (1− s)
∫
[as,a¯s]
x(db,st)(vb, vs)fstsdvs + s
∫
[as,a¯s]
x(db,tr)(vb, vs)ftrsdvs
x¯(s,ds)(vs) ≡ (1− b)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
x(st,ds)(vb, vs)fstbdvb + b
∫
[ab,a¯b]
x(tr,ds)(vb, vs)ftrbdvb
Payoffs of the players for any given outcome of a trading mechanism are:
U(b,db)(vb) = vbp¯(b,db)(vb)− x¯(b,db)(vb)
U(s,ds)(vs) = x¯(s,ds)(vs)− vsp¯(s,ds)(vs)
Definition 2.2. IC∗: An outcome of a trading mechanism is incentive compatible* for the
strategic types if
U(b,st)(vb) ≥ vbp¯(b,st)(v′b)− x¯(b,st)(v′b), ∀vb, v′b
U(s,st)(vs) ≥ x¯(s,st)(v′s)− vsp¯(s,st)(v′s), ∀vs, v′s.
Any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium outcome of a trading mechanism will satisfy IC∗, oth-
erwise some valuation type of a strategic-type player will prefer to imitate the strategy of
another valuation type of that strategic-type player.
If the players are only strategic type, then IC∗ is the only incentive constraint that will
10We sometimes drop the argument vi of the function fdi to simplify notation.
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be satisfied by a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium outcome of a trading mechanism. However, now
that the problem also has the trustworthy-type players, it must also be that in equilibrium,
any valuation type of a strategic-type player does not want to imitate the strategy of any
valuation type of the trustworthy type of that player. Thus, any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
outcome of a trading mechanism will satisfy incentive compatibility (IC) defined below.
Definition 2.3. IC: An outcome of a trading mechanism is incentive compatible for the
strategic types if it is IC∗ and
U(b,st)(vb) ≥ vbp¯(b,tr)(v′b)− x¯(b,tr)(v′b), ∀vb, v′b
U(s,st)(vs) ≥ x¯(s,tr)(v′s)− vsp¯(s,tr)(v′s), ∀vs, v′s
Thus, although adding the trustworthy types to the problem relaxes the incentive con-
straints for a proportion of the players (i.e., the trustworthy types), it also adds to the total
number of incentive constraints in the problem.
Definition 2.4. IR: An outcome of a trading mechanism is individually rational if ∀i,
U(i,di)(vi) ≥ 0, ∀(vi, di)
IR says that all types of all players get non-negative payoffs. Any Bayesian-Nash equi-
librium outcome a trading mechanism will satisfy IR since the outside option for all types
of all players is equal to 0.
2.1 Necessary Conditions for IC and IR Mechanisms
The following lemma gives the necessary conditions that any IC∗ (and thus any IC) outcome
of a trading mechanism will satisfy.
Lemma 2.5. For any IC∗ outcome of a trading mechanism it must be that:
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1. p¯(b,st)(vb) is weakly increasing and p¯(s,st)(vs) is weakly decreasing.
2. U(b,st)(vb) = U(b,st)(ab) +
∫
[ab,vb]
p¯(b,st)(yb)dyb.
3. U(s,st)(vs) = U(s,st)(a¯s) +
∫
[vs,a¯s]
p¯(s,st)(ys)dys.
4. The following equality holds:
(1− b)(1− s)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
([
vb − 1− Fstb(vb)
fstb(vb)
]
−
[
vs +
Fsts(vs)
fsts(vs)
])
p(st,st)(vb, vs)fstsfstbdvsdvb
+ b(1− s)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
(
vb −
[
vs +
Fsts(vs)
fsts(vs)
])
p(tr,st)(vb, vs)fstsftrbdvsdvb
+ s(1− b)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
([
vb − 1− Fstb(vb)
fstb(vb)
]
− vs
)
p(st,tr)(vb, vs)ftrsfstbdvsdvb
+ bs
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
(vb − vs)p(tr,tr)(vb, vs)ftrsftrbdvsdvb
= (1− b)U(b,st)(ab) + (1− s)U(s,st)(a¯s) + b
∫
[ab,a¯b]
U(b,tr)(vb)ftrbdvb + s
∫
[as,a¯s]
U(s,tr)(vs)ftrsdvs
(1)
The first condition in the lemma is the monotonicity property of the probability of trade
functions of the strategic types. It says that a higher valuation type of the strategic-type
buyer (seller) must be weakly more (less) likely to trade than a lower valuation type of the
strategic-type buyer (seller). Similarly, the second and third conditions in the lemma are
the monotonicity properties of the payoffs of the strategic types. More importantly, the
second condition implies that any valuation type of the strategic-type buyer with valuation
greater than ab has to be paid
∫
[ab,vb]
p¯(b,st)(yb)dyb more than U(b,st)(ab) to ensure that she
does not imitate the strategy of another valuation type of the strategic-type buyer. Similarly,
the third condition says that any valuation type of the strategic-type seller with valuation
less than a¯s has to be paid
∫
[vs,a¯s]
p¯(s,st)(ys)dys more than U(s,st)(a¯s) to ensure that she does
not imitate the strategy of another valuation type of the strategic-type seller. These extra
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payments can thus be interpreted as the “cost of IC∗” on the trading mechanism. Finally,
(1) is just an accounting identity, which says that the expected gains from trade minus the
expected cost of IC∗ equals the expected payoff of the players minus the expected cost of
IC∗.
Lemma 2.6. Any outcome of a trading mechanism that satisfies IC and IR must be such
that
1. U(b,st)(vb) = U(b,st)(ab) +
∫
[ab,vb]
p¯(b,st)(yb)dyb ≥ (vb − v′b)p¯(b,tr)(v′b), ∀vb, v′b.
2. U(b,st)(vs) = U(s,st)(a¯s) +
∫
[vs,a¯s]
p¯(s,st)(ys)dys ≥ (v′s − vs)p¯(s,tr)(v′s), ∀vs, v′s.
Individual rationality constraints for the trustworthy types imply that the expected pay-
ment of the trustworthy-type buyer with valuation v′b cannot exceed v
′
bp¯(b,tr)(v
′
b) and the
expected amount received by the trustworthy-type seller with valuation v′s cannot be less
than v′sp¯(s,tr)(v
′
s). Thus, we can interpret (vb − v′b)p¯(b,tr)(v′b) as the least possible payoff that
the strategic-type buyer with valuation vb could get by imitating the valuation type v
′
b of the
trustworthy-type buyer. Similarly, we can interpret (v′s − vs)p¯(s,tr)(v′s) as the least possible
payoff that the strategic-type seller with valuation vs could get by imitating the valuation
type v′s of the trustworthy-type seller. Lemma 2.6 says that a necessary condition for an
outcome of a trading mechanism to satisfy IC and IR is that the payoff of any strategic-type
player with valuation type vi must be at least equal to the least possible payoff that she could
get by imitating any valuation type v′i of the trustworthy type of that player.
2.2 Sufficient Conditions for IC and IR Direct Mechanisms
A direct mechanism is such that each player is asked to report her type, (vi, di), and for each
reported pair of types, it specifies an outcome. Hence, we can identify a direct mechanism
with its outcome. Trustworthy-type players send truthful reports. Therefore, any direct
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mechanism that satisfies IC is such that truth-telling by all types of both players is a
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Note that the revelation principle still holds since any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium outcome
of any trading mechanism must satisfy IC and trustworthy types report their type truthfully
in a direct mechanism.
The next proposition gives conditions on the probability of trade functions that are
sufficient to construct a direct mechanism that satisfies IC and IR.
Proposition 2.7. Suppose (p(db,ds))db=st,tr; ds=st,tr are functions from [ab, a¯b]×[as, a¯s] to [0, 1].
If the following four conditions are satisfied, then there exist functions (x(db,ds))db=st,tr; ds=st,tr
such that (p(db,ds), x(db,ds))db=st,tr; ds=st,tr is a direct mechanism that satisfies IC and IR.
1. p¯(b,st)(vb) is weakly increasing, p¯(s,st)(vs) is weakly decreasing.
2.
∫
[ab,vb]
p¯(b,st)(yb)dyb ≥ (vb − v′b)p¯(b,tr)(v′b), ∀vb, v′b.
3.
∫
[vs,a¯s]
p¯(s,st)(ys)dys ≥ (v′s − vs)p¯(s,tr)(v′s), ∀vs, v′s.
4. The following inequality holds:
(1− b)(1− s)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
([
vb − 1− Fstb(vb)
fstb(vb)
]
−
[
vs +
Fsts(vs)
fsts(vs)
])
p(st,st)(vb, vs)fstsfstbdvsdvb
+ b(1− s)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
(
vb −
[
vs +
Fsts(vs)
fsts(vs)
])
p(tr,st)(vb, vs)fstsftrbdvsdvb
+ s(1− b)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
([
vb − 1− Fstb(vb)
fstb(vb)
]
− vs
)
p(st,tr)(vb, vs)ftrsfstbdvsdvb
+ bs
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
(vb − vs)p(tr,tr)(vb, vs)ftrsftrbdvsdvb
≥ 0 (2)
The first condition is again the monotonicity property of the probability of trade functions
of the strategic types. Only this monotonicity condition is used to construct a set of payment
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functions so that we get a direct mechanism that satisfies IC∗. These payment functions
are constructed so that all the gains from trade generated by the trustworthy types are
transferred to the strategic types using lump-sum transfers and thus the trustworthy types
are pushed to their individual rationality constraints. Moreover, by construction, the payoff
of the lowest valuation type of the strategic-type buyer is equal to 0. Then (2) implies IR
for the strategic types. With IC∗ and IR satisfied, the second and third conditions in the
proposition immediately guarantee IC for the strategic types.
Inequality (2) says that the expected gains from trade minus the expected cost of IC∗
is non-negative. Of course, this inequality is also a necessary condition for any IC∗ and
IR direct mechanism (follows from (1)). What is interesting is that this inequality is also
sufficient for constructing an IC and IR direct mechanism. Why does not the inequality
require expected gains from trade minus the “expected cost of IC” to be non-negative? This
is because of the second and third conditions in the proposition; whenever these hold, going
from an IC∗ and IR mechanism to an IC and IR mechanism can be achieved for “free” by
pushing the trustworthy types to 0 payoffs.
Myerson and Satterthwaite [15] analyze the bilateral trading problem without trustworthy
types, that is, b = s = 0. So in their setup, IC
∗ is equivalent to IC. Myerson and
Satterthwaite [15, Theorem 1] shows that the monotonicity property of the probability of
trade functions and the expected gains from trade greater than or equal to the expected
cost of IC∗ are both necessary and sufficient for there to exist payment functions that
along with the probability of trade functions define an IR and IC∗ direct mechanism. Here
we also have trustworthy types. Although trustworthy types do not themselves add more
constraints on the mechanism since they reveal themselves truthfully, their presence provides
the strategic types an additional opportunity to misreport their type. Thus, we require more
sufficient conditions (the second and third conditions in Proposition 2.7) to stop this kind
of misreporting.
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3 Is More Trust Always Better?
In this section, we show that whether an increase in the levels of trust increases the proba-
bility of trade among the strategic types depends on the trading mechanism. Subsection 3.1
considers a bilateral trading problem with uniform distributions of valuations of all disposi-
tion types. In that trading problem, if the levels of trust are positive, then the probability of
trade among the strategic types in any equilibrium outcome of any k-double auction is lower
than the maximum probability of trade that can be achieved using k-double auctions when
the players completely distrust each other. In contrast, in Subsection 3.2 we prove that if we
use direct mechanisms to solve the trading problem, then an increase in the levels of trust
is weakly better. This is because then we can design a new direct mechanism that will have
at least as high probability of trade among the strategic types as before. In Subsection 3.3,
we use these two results to comment on the constraint-inefficiency of k-double auctions in
the problem with uniform priors on valuations.
3.1 k-Double Auction with Uniform Priors
A k-double auction is a trading mechanism in which both players simultaneously submit
sealed bids. If the buyer’s bid pb is greater than or equal to seller’s bid ps, then trade takes
place at price kpb + (1− k)ps, where k ∈ [0, 1]; otherwise, there is no trade and no payment
by the buyer to the seller.
For a bilateral trading problem with only strategic types and valuations of both players
distributed uniformly and independently on [0, 1], Myerson and Satterthwaite [15] prove
that the maximum ex-ante probability of trade achievable in any equilibrium of any trading
mechanism equals 9
32
. This upper bound is achieved in a 1
2
-double auction when players play
the Chatterjee-Samuelson (C-S) linear equilibrium strategies (Chatterjee and Samuelson
[3]). Proposition 3.1 proves that when the valuations of all disposition types are distributed
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uniformly and independently on [0, 1], then for all positive levels of trust, any Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium outcome of any k-double auction will have a lower ex-ante probability of trade
among strategic types than 9
32
. Thus, higher levels of trust are not necessarily better if the
trading mechanisms are in the set of k-double auctions.
So for now [as, a¯s] = [ab, a¯b] = [0, 1]. Also, Fstb = Fsts = Ftrb = Ftrs are uniform on [0, 1].
By assumption, the trustworthy types bid truthfully. Let Γ(k,b,s) denote the game defined
by this trading mechanism.
Proposition 3.1. For all k ∈ [0, 1] and (b, s), such that (0, 0)  (b, s)  (1, 1), the ex-
ante probability of trade in the event that both players are strategic type in any equilibrium
of Γ(k,b,s) is less than the the ex-ante probability of trade in the C-S equilibrium.
We present an outline of the proof. For a pair (b, s), we first define a set of trading
outcomes M(b,s) that satisfy certain restrictions. One of these restrictions is that the
probability that the strategic-type buyer (seller) trades with the strategic-type seller (buyer)
is weakly increasing (decreasing) in the former’s valuation. The second step is to show
that for any M (b,s) ∈ M(b,s), there exists a (ˆb, ˆs)  (b, s) and a trading outcome
M (ˆb,ˆs) ∈ M(ˆb,ˆs) such that the ex-ante probability of trade in the event that both players
are strategic type is strictly higher in M (ˆb,ˆs) than in M (b,s). The next step is to prove that
any equilibrium outcome of any Γ(k,b,s) in which the ex-ante probability of trade among the
strategic types is at least as high 9
32
is an element of the set of trading outcomes M(b,s).
The bid of the strategic-type player is weakly increasing in her valuation and therefore the
equilibrium outcome satisfies the restriction mentioned above. Using the second step, we
are then able to construct a sequence of trading outcomes each in M(nb ,ns ) with (nb , ns )
converging to (0, 0) and the ex-ante probabilities of trade between the strategic types in
the corresponding trading outcomes converging to some value greater than 9
32
. Then we
construct a trading outcome for the bilateral trading problem in which both players are only
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strategic type and their valuations are distributed uniformly on [0, 1], which has a higher ex-
ante probability of trade than 9
32
. This contradicts the result of Myerson and Satterthwaite
[15] mentioned above.
There is an intuitive way to understand why Proposition 3.1 is true. Although this
intuition is different from the method of proof presented in this paper, we expect it can
be used to prove the same result for at least differentiable and strictly increasing pair of
equilibrium strategies. Starting from an equilibrium pair of strategies of Γ(k,b,s), any slight
increase in s increases the probability that the seller bids “lower” because the trustworthy-
type seller does not exaggerate her bid. This makes it “cheaper” for the strategic-type buyer
to bid lower. Similarly, any slight increase in b increases the probability that the buyer
bids “higher”, which in turn makes it “cheaper” for the strategic-type seller to bid higher.
With the strategic-type buyer bidding lower and the strategic-type seller bidding higher, the
probability of trade between them falls.
3.2 Direct Mechanism
The next proposition shows that if we are not restricted to the set of k-double auctions
but allowed to choose any trading mechanism from the set of direct mechanisms, then we
can always construct a new direct mechanism that has at least as high probability of trade
among the strategic types as in the mechanism that was in use before the increase in the
levels of trust.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose for the bilateral trading problem ((b, s), (Fsti , Ftri)i=b,s)), where
(b, s)  (1, 1), the direct mechanism (p(db,ds), x(db,ds))db=st,tr; ds=st,tr satisfies IC and IR.
Consider any (′b, 
′
s) such that (b, s) ≤ (′b, ′s)  (1, 1). Then there exists a direct mecha-
nism (p′(db,ds), x
′
(db,ds)
)db=st,tr; ds=st,tr for the bilateral trading problem ((
′
b, 
′
s), (Fsti , Ftri)i=b,s))
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satisfying IC and IR, which is such that
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
p′(st,st)(vb, vs)fstsfstbdvsdvb ≥
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
p(st,st)(vb, vs)fstsfstbdvsdvb.
An increase in the levels of trust does not relax the IC and IR constraints. Instead,
more weight is put on the outcome associated with a trustworthy opponent for each type
of a player. In the proof, we construct a direct mechanism (p′(db,ds), x
′
(db,ds)
) that reduces
proportionately for each type of a player both the probability of trade and the payment
whenever that player meets with a trustworthy opponent. This then reduces the payoff
of each type of a player in a fixed proportion. Moreover, this proportion is kept constant
across all valuation types of the strategic type of a player to ensure IC∗. However, to stop
a strategic type from misreporting herself as trustworthy, the payoff of any valuation type
of the trustworthy-type player is reduced by a greater proportion than the payoff of any
valuation type of the strategic type of that player. The constructed mechanism satisfies IR
since the payoffs of the players in that mechanism are proportional to the payoffs in the
older mechanism (p(db,ds), x(db,ds)). We do not use the sufficient conditions of Proposition 2.7
for this proof, so the constructed mechanism (p′(db,ds), x
′
(db,ds)
) does not push the trustworthy
types to 0 payoffs.
3.3 Constraint-Inefficiency of k-Double Auctions
Myerson and Satterthwaite [15] prove that the set of k-double auctions is constraint-efficient
if the valuations of the players are distributed uniformly and independently on [0, 1] and
b = s = 0. This is because in this trading problem, the C-S equilibrium outcome of a
1
2
-double auction attains the highest ex-ante probability of trade (equal to 9
32
) relative to
any equilibrium outcome of any trading mechanism. We now argue that this result is not
robust.
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Proposition 3.1 tells us that if the valuations of the players are distributed uniformly and
independently on [0, 1] and (0, 0)  (b, s)  (1, 1), then the ex-ante probability of trade
among the strategic types in any equilibrium outcome of any k-double auction is strictly less
than 9
32
. Since it is possible to attain an ex-ante probability of trade among the strategic
types equal to 9
32
when b = s = 0, Proposition 3.2 tells us that for any (b, s), there exist
direct mechanisms with the ex-ante probability of trade among the strategic types at least as
high as 9
32
. Hence, for generic (b, s), the set of k-double auctions is constraint-inefficient in
the trading problem with uniform priors on the set of valuations. In other words, constraint-
efficiency of the set of k-double auctions is not robust to perturbations in the disposition
type of the players.
4 Is Ex-Post Efficiency Possible?
Proposition 3.2 tells us that as the levels of trust increase, we can weakly reduce the ineffi-
ciency caused by the strategic behavior if we are allowed to use direct mechanisms. What is
the limit of this fall in inefficiency? Can we get ex-post efficiency?
An outcome of a mechanism is ex-post efficient for the strategic types if trade occurs if
and only if the valuation type of the strategic buyer is at least as high as the valuation type
of the strategic seller.
Definition 4.1. EX∗: An outcome of a trading mechanism is ex-post efficient for the
strategic types if
p(st,st)(vb, vs) =
 1 if vb ≥ vs0 if vb < vs
We can similarly define ex-post efficiency.
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Definition 4.2. EX: An outcome of a trading mechanism is ex-post efficient if ∀(db, ds),
p(db,ds)(vb, vs) =
 1 if vb ≥ vs0 if vb < vs
Note that EX =⇒ EX∗.
The following theorem is a restatement of Myerson and Satterthwaite [15, Corollary 1]
which proves that when both players are only strategic type and the intersection of the
intervals of players’ valuations has a non-empty interior, then it is impossible to achieve
ex-post efficiency in any outcome of any trading mechanism that satisfies IC∗ and IR.11
Theorem 4.3. If b = s = 0 and (ab, a¯b)∩(as, a¯s) 6= ∅, then there does not exist an outcome
of any trading mechanism that satisfies EX, IC∗ and IR.
Proof : See Myerson and Satterthwaite [15, Corollary 1]. 
Myerson and Satterthwaite [15] showed that any outcome of a trading mechanism that
satisfies EX and IC∗ will require an ex-ante subsidy of at least
∫
[ab,a¯s]
(1− Fstb(y))Fsts(y)dy
to satisfy IR since the expected cost of IC∗ exceeds the expected gains from trade by that
amount. Section 4.1 shows how this subsidy can be generated if and only if at least one player
has a high enough trust in the other player. The constructed optimal trading mechanism
is a direct mechanism. Section 4.2, however, shows that k-double auctions with or without
any form of pre-play communication are ex-post inefficient for all levels of trust.
4.1 Achieving Ex-Post Efficiency Using Direct Mechanisms
Proposition 4.4. There exist weakly decreasing functions ψi : [0, 1] → [0, 1], i = b, s with
ψi(i) < 1 ∀ i > 0, such that for all (ˆi, ˆj) ≥ (i, ψi(i)) there exist direct mechanisms that
satisfy IC, IR and EX (and hence, they also satisfy EX∗).
11Note that in this case, EX∗ is equivalent to EX and IC∗ is equivalent to IC.
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We use Proposition 2.7 in the proof. The first three conditions in Proposition 2.7 are
trivially satisfied by any EX outcome. Moreover, (2) is satisfied if the probabilities of trust-
worthy types are high enough. When the probabilities of trustworthy types are high enough,
the ex-ante gains from trade are greater than the expected cost of IC∗ in a direct mecha-
nism that satisfies EX because of the truthful revelation by the trustworthy types. Note
that the payment functions constructed in the proof of Proposition 2.7 are such that every
valuation type of the trustworthy-type player gets an expected-payoff of 0. Thus, by pushing
the trustworthy types to their individual rationality constraints, we extract all the ex-ante
gains from trade that they generate and then redistribute them using lump-sum transfers to
the strategic types. So, and this point is crucial, we use the gains of the trustworthy types
to subsidize the strategic types in order to induce the latter to report truthfully. Hence, it
becomes possible to get an ex-post efficient outcome even while satisfying IC and IR.
Proposition 4.4 also brings forward the trade-off between the levels of trust of the two
players: an increase in the level of trust of one player in the other player reduces the threshold
on the level of trust of the latter player on the former player that is needed to achieve ex-post
efficiency.
4.2 Inefficiency of k-double auctions
If any i = 1, then it is straightforward to satisfy EX in a k-double auction. For instance, if
b = 1, then take k = 1. In this double auction, truthful bid dominates any other bid for the
strategic-type seller. All trustworthy types of both the buyer and seller bid truthfully. So
we get an ex-post efficient outcome. Therefore, in what follows, we assume (b, s) (1, 1).
Proposition 4.5. If (b, s)  (1, 1) and (as, a¯s) ∩ (ab, a¯b) 6= Φ, then no Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium outcome of any k-double auction satisfies EX∗, and hence, it also does not
satisfy EX.
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The above inefficiency result applies to k-double auctions in which players do not commu-
nicate before submitting their bids. Players can “reduce” the uncertainty by communicating
their types in equilibrium (Farrell and Gibbons [5]). Since incomplete information is the
reason for inefficiency, we could ask whether allowing for pre-play communication generates
ex-post efficient outcomes. To answer this question, let’s consider a k-double auction with
a pre-play communication stage, in which players communicate, sequentially or simultane-
ously, using some arbitrary message space before the final stage during which they play
according to the rules of the k-double auction. In this case, assuming that the trustwor-
thy types bid truthfully in the k-double auction stage of the game seems to be a strong
restriction on their behavior. For example, the trustworthy types may make pre-play non-
binding verbal agreements to bid some value not equal to their valuation and then fulfilling
such agreements in the bidding stage. So we instead make the weakest possible assumption
about the bidding behavior of the trustworthy types. We assume that the trustworthy types
do not bid “irrationally”, that is, the trustworthy buyer (seller) does not bid greater (less)
than her valuation. This assumption does not restrict the behavior of the trustworthy types
in the communication stage apart from not allowing such types to verbally agree to bid
“irrationally”.
Assumption 4.6. In a k-double auction with pre-play communication, the trustworthy
buyer does not bid more than her valuation and the trustworthy seller does not bid less than
her valuation.
Proposition 4.7. Suppose Assumption 4.6 holds. If ab ≤ as and a¯b ≤ a¯s, then for all
(b, s)  (1, 1), no Bayesian-Nash equilibrium outcome of any k-double auction with pre-
play communication satisfies EX.
Intuitively, the reason for inefficiency is that a k-double auction with or without pre-play
communication is unable to adequately subsidize the strategic types to ensure that they do
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not misreport their respective types. Since trade occurs at a weighted average of the two
bids and the trustworthy-type buyer bids at most her valuation and the trustworthy-type
seller bids at least her valuation, the trustworthy types are able to retain enough gains from
trade for themselves. In a direct mechanism, these gains from trade could be transferred to
the strategic types to satisfy their incentive constraints but this cannot be done in k-double
auctions because of the weighted-average pricing rule.
Remark 4.8. Two remarks need to be made regarding Proposition 4.7.
1. We have proved that any equilibrium outcome of any k-double auction with pre-
play communication will not satisfy EX, which does not imply that any equilibrium
outcome will not satisfy EX∗. However, it seems reasonable that the behavior of
trustworthy types in a k-double auction with pre-play communication is such that
if a pair of valuation types of the strategic-type players for whom the gains from
trade are non-negative, trade in equilibrium with probability 1, then the same pair
of valuation types must also trade in equilibrium with probability 1 if one or both
the players are trustworthy type. More precisely, trustworthy behavior should imply
that the following holds in any equilibrium outcome of any k-double auction with
pre-play communication: if for any (vb, vs), with vb ≥ vs, p(st,st)(vb, vs) = 1 , then
p(tr,st)(vb, vs) = p(st,tr)(vb, vs) = p(tr,tr)(vb, vs) = 1. If the equilibrium outcome satisfies
this property, then EX∗ is equivalent to EX and hence, Proposition 4.7 will imply
that no equilibrium of any k-double auction with pre-play communication will satisfy
EX∗.
2. The proposition is valid if ab ≤ as and a¯b ≤ a¯s. In particular, it is true when the
interval of valuations coincide. However, we have not been successful in proving the
proposition if either as < ab or a¯s < a¯b.
24
5 Conclusion
We introduced trustworthy-type traders in bilateral trading and studied the consequence
of the resulting uncertainty regarding each others trustworthiness on the behavior of the
strategic-type traders. We showed that an increase in the levels of trust can reduce the
maximum probability of trade among the strategic types that is attainable using any trading
mechanism from the set of k-double auctions. This is because the strategic-type traders try
to capitalize on the trustworthy-type traders’ honesty. We also argued that this negative
result reflects a lack of flexibility of design in the set of k-double auctions compared to the
set of direct mechanisms since it is always possible to construct direct mechanisms that have
weakly higher probability of trade among the strategic types whenever there is an increase in
the levels of trust. As a consequence, k-double auctions were shown to be generically (w.r.t.
the levels of trust) constraint-inefficient in the trading problem with uniform priors.
A positive result of this study, in contrast to the previously known Impossibility Theorem
(Myerson and Satterthwaite [15]), is that if at least one player has a high enough level of
trust in the other player, then for any bilateral trading problem, it is possible to construct
incentive compatible and individually rational direct mechanisms that are ex-post efficient.
These efficient mechanisms induce the strategic types to reveal truthfully by providing them
enough subsidy through lump-sum transfers of the gains of the trustworthy types. This
subsidization, however, is not adequate in the set of k-double auctions and therefore, k-
double auctions are inefficient for all levels of trust. In fact, for the same reason, any form
of communication between the players before they use a k-double auction to trade will not
help in achieving ex-post efficiency.
The notably different effect of trust in the set of direct mechanisms vis-a`-vis the set of k-
double auctions caution against generalizations regarding the consequence of trust in various
institutions. The structure and rules of different institutions imply different opportunities
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for and consequences of strategic behavior. The rules of k-double auctions are such that
the strategic types act “tough” if they believe that the other player could be trustworthy;
whereas the same belief can be used in direct mechanisms to give incentives to the strategic
types to reveal truthfully. This also emphasizes that by designing the “right” institutions,
we can provide incentives to the strategic types that improve the welfare of society.
6 Proofs
We only provide proofs for one player to avoid repetition. ti is the bid of player i, σi(vi) is
the equilibrium strategy (mixed or pure) of the strategic-type of player i with valuation type
vi, Supp(σi(vi)) is the support of σi(vi) and Gi is the distribution of bids induced by σi. Let
ti = sup{ti|Gi(ti) = 0} and t¯i = inf{ti|Gi(ti) = 1}.
Proof of Lemma 2.5: IC∗ implies that ∀vb, v′b
U(b,st)(vb) = vbp¯(b,st)(vb)− x¯(b,st)(vb) ≥ vbp¯(b,st)(v′b)− x¯(b,st)(v′b)
and
U(b,st)(v
′
b) = v
′
bp¯(b,st)(v
′
b)− x¯(b,st)(v′b) ≥ v′bp¯(b,st)(vb)− x¯(b,st)(vb).
Therefore we must have,
(vb − v′b)p¯(b,st)(vb) ≥ U(b,st)(vb)− U(b,st)(v′b) ≥ (vb − v′b)p¯(b,st)(v′b).
Hence if vb > v
′
b then it must be that p¯(b,st)(vb) ≥ p¯(b,st)(v′b). This then implies that
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dU(b,st)
dvb
= p¯(b,st)(vb) at almost all vb. Therefore we get
U(b,st)(vb) = U(b,st)(ab) +
∫
[ab,vb]
p¯(b,st)(yb)dyb.
Similarly we can show that if vs > v
′
s then it must be that p¯(s,st)(vs) ≤ p¯(s,st)(v′s) and
U(s,st)(vs) = U(s,st)(a¯s) +
∫
[vs,a¯s]
p¯(s,st)(ys)dys.
Any mechanism that satisfies IC∗ must be such that
(1− b)(1− s)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
(vb − vs)p(st,st)(vb, vs)fstsfstbdvsdvb
+ b(1− s)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
(vb − vs)p(tr,st)(vb, vs)fstsftrbdvsdvb
+ s(1− b)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
(vb − vs)p(st,tr)(vb, vs)ftrsfstsdvsdvb
+ bs
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
(vb − vs)p(tr,tr)(vb, vs)ftrsftrbdvsdvb
= (1− b)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
U(b,st)(vb)fstbdvb + b
∫
[ab,a¯b]
U(b,tr)(vb)ftrbdvb
+ (1− s)
∫
[as,a¯s]
U(s,st)(vs)fstsdvs + s
∫
[as,a¯s]
U(s,tr)(vs)ftrsdvs
= (1− b)
(
U(b,st)(ab) +
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[ab,vb]
p¯(b,st)(yb)dybfstbdvb
)
+ (1− s)
(
U(s,st)(a¯s) +
∫
[as,a¯s]
∫
[vs,a¯s]
p¯(s,st)(ys)dysfstsdvs
)
+ b
∫
[ab,a¯b]
U(b,tr)(vb)ftrbdvb + s
∫
[as,a¯s]
U(s,tr)(vs)ftrsdvs
= (1− b)U(b,st)(ab) + (1− s)U(s,st)(a¯s)
+ b
∫
[ab,a¯b]
U(b,tr)(vb)ftrbdvb + s
∫
[as,a¯s]
U(s,tr)(vs)ftrsdvs
+ (1− b)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
p¯(b,st)(vb)(1− Fstb(vb))dvb + (1− s)
∫
[as,a¯s]
p¯(s,st)(vs)Fsts(vs)dvs (3)
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However,
(1− b)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
p¯(b,st)(vb)(1− Fstb(vb))dvb + (1− s)
∫
[as,a¯s]
p¯(s,st)(vs)Fsts(vs)dvs
= (1− b)(1− s)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
p(st,st)(vb, vs)(1− Fstb(vb))fstsdvsdvb
+ (1− b)s
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
p(st,tr)(vb, vs)(1− Fstb(vb))ftrsdvsdvb
+ (1− s)(1− b)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
p(st,st)(vb, vs)Fsts(vs)fstbdvsdvb
+ (1− s)b
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
p(tr,st)(vb, vs)Fsts(vs)ftrbdvsdvb
By subtracting the above equation from (3) we get (1). 
Proof of Lemma 2.6: Since (p(db,ds), x(db,ds)) satisfies IC and IR,
U(b,st)(vb) =U(b,st)(ab) +
∫
[ab,vb]
p¯(b,st)(yb)dyb
≥vbp¯(b,tr)(v′b)− x¯(b,tr)(v′b)
≥vbp¯(b,tr)(v′b)− v′bp¯(b,tr)(v′b)
=(vb − v′b)p¯(b,tr)(v′b),
where the second inequality follows from IR for trustworthy types. 
Proof of Proposition 2.7: Consider the following cases:
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Case 1 : b < 1 and s < 1. Define
x(st,st)(vb, vs) =
1
1− s
∫
[ab,vb]
ybdp¯(b,st)(yb) +
1
1− b
∫
[as,vs]
ysdp¯(s,st)(ys)
+
1
1− sabp¯b(ab)−
1
1− b
∫
[as,a¯s]
ys(1− Fsts(ys))dp¯(s,st)(ys)
− s
(1− b)(1− s)
∫
[as,a¯s]
ysp¯(s,tr)(ys)ftrs(ys)dys
x(st,tr)(vb, vs) =
1
1− bvsp¯(s,tr)(vs)
x(tr,st)(vb, vs) =
1
1− svbp¯(b,tr)(vb)
x(tr,tr)(vb, vs) =0
It is easy to calculate that:
x¯(b,st)(vb) =
∫
[ab,vb]
ybdp¯(b,st)(yb) +
1− s
1− b
∫
[as,a¯s]
∫
[as,vs]
ysfsts(vs)dp¯(s,st)(ys)dvs
+ abp¯b(ab)−
1− s
1− b
∫
[as,a¯s]
ys(1− Fsts(ys))dp¯(s,st)(ys)
− s
1− b
∫
[as,a¯s]
ysp¯(s,tr)(ys)ftrs(ys)dys +
s
1− b
∫
[as,a¯s]
vsp¯(s,tr)(vs)ftrs(vs)dvs
=
∫
[ab,vb]
ybdp¯(b,st)(yb) +
1− s
1− b
∫
[as,a¯s]
ys(1− Fsts(ys))dp¯(s,st)(ys)
+ abp¯b(ab)−
1− s
1− b
∫
[as,a¯s]
ys(1− Fsts(ys))dp¯(s,st)(ys)
=
∫
[ab,vb]
ybdp¯(b,st)(yb) + abp¯b(ab)
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x¯(s,st)(vs) =
1− b
1− s
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[ab,vb]
ybfstb(vb)dp¯(b,st)(yb)dvb +
∫
[as,vs]
ysdp¯(s,st)(ys)
+
1− b
1− sabp¯b(ab)−
∫
[as,a¯s]
ys(1− Fsts(ys))dp¯(s,st)(ys)
− s
1− s
∫
[as,a¯s]
ysp¯(s,tr)(ys)ftrs(ys)dys +
b
1− s
∫
[ab,a¯b]
vbp¯(b,tr)(vb)ftrb(vb)dvb
x¯(b,tr)(vb) =vbp¯(b,tr)(vb)
x¯(s,tr)(vs) =vsp¯(s,tr)(vs)
Then the payoffs of the strategic types are:
U(b,st)(vb) =vbp¯(b,st)(vb)−
∫
[ab,vb]
ybdp¯(b,st)(yb)− abp¯b(ab)
U(s,st)(vs) =− vsp¯(s,st)(vs) + 1− b
1− s
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[ab,vb]
ybfstb(vb)dp¯(b,st)(yb)dvb +
∫
[as,vs]
ysdp¯(s,st)(ys)
+
1− b
1− sabp¯b(ab)−
∫
[as,a¯s]
ys(1− Fsts(ys))dp¯(s,st)(ys)
− s
1− s
∫
[as,a¯s]
ysp¯(s,tr)(ys)ftrs(ys)dys +
b
1− s
∫
[ab,a¯b]
vbp¯(b,tr)(vb)ftrb(vb)dvb
The trustworthy types satisfy their IR constraints because
U(b,tr)(vb) = vbp¯(b,tr)(vb)− x¯(b,tr)(vb) = vbp¯(b,tr)(vb)− vbp¯(b,tr)(vb) = 0
U(s,tr)(vs) = x¯(s,tr)(vs)− vsp¯(s,tr)(vs) = vsp¯(s,tr)(vs)− vsp¯(s,tr)(vs) = 0.
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Next we check IC∗. ∀v′b < vb, we have (a similar argument works if v′b > vb)
vbp¯(b,st)(vb)− x¯(b,st)(vb)− (vbp¯(b,st)(v′b)− x¯(b,st)(v′b))
= vb(p¯(b,st)(vb)− p¯(b,st)(v′b))−
∫
[v′b,vb]
ybdp¯(b,st)(yb)
=
∫
[v′b,vb]
(vb − yb)dp¯(b,st)(yb) ≥ 0
∀v′s > vs, we have (a similar argument works if v′s < vs)
x¯(s,st)(vs)− vsp¯(s,st)(vs)− (x¯(s,st)(v′s)− vsp¯(s,st)(v′s))
=
∫
[as,vs]
ysdp¯(s,st)(ys)− vsp¯(s,st)(vs)−
∫
[as,v
′
s]
ysdp¯(s,st)(ys) + vsp¯(s,st)(v
′
s)
= vs(p¯(s,st)(v
′
s)− p¯(s,st)(vs))−
∫
[vs,v′s]
ysdp¯(s,st)(ys)
=
∫
[vs,v′s]
(vs − ys)dp¯(s,st)(ys) ≥ 0
Therefore, the constructed mechanism satisfies (1). Since U(b,st)(ab) = 0, U(b,tr)(vb) =
0 ∀vb, U(s,tr)(vs) = 0 ∀vs and the functions p(st,st), p(st,tr), p(tr,st), p(tr,tr) satisfy (2), it implies
that U(s,tr)(a¯s) ≥ 0. It is easy to see that U(b,st)(vb) is non-decreasing and U(s,st)(vs) is
non-increasing, therefore, the mechanism satisfies IR for the strategic types.
Now, we check that no strategic type will misreport herself as trustworthy type. Since
the mechanism satisfies IC∗ and U(b,st)(ab) = 0,
U(b,st)(vb) = U(b,st)(ab) +
∫
[ab,vb]
p¯(b,st)(yb)dyb
=
∫
[ab,vb]
p¯(b,st)(yb)dyb
≥ (vb − v′b)p¯(b,tr)(v′b)
= vbp¯(b,tr)(v
′
b)− x¯(b,tr)(v′b),
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where the inequality follows from the second condition in the proposition. Similarly,
U(s,st)(vs) = U(s,st)(a¯s) +
∫
[vs,a¯s]
p¯(s,st)(ys)dys
≥
∫
[vs,a¯s]
p¯(s,st)(ys)dys
≥ (v′s − vs)p¯(s,tr)(v′s)
= x¯(s,tr)(v
′
s)− vsp¯(s,tr)(v′s),
where the second inequality follows from the third condition in the proposition.
Case 2 : b = 1 and s < 1. Define
x(tr,st)(vb, vs) =
∫
[as,vs]
ysdp¯(s,st)(ys)−
∫
[as,a¯s]
ys(1− Fsts(ys))dp¯(s,st)(ys)
− s
1− s
∫
[as,a¯s]
ysp¯(s,tr)(ys)ftrs(ys)dys +
1
1− s vbp¯(b,tr)(vb)
x(tr,tr)(vb, vs) =vsp¯(s,tr)(vs)
It is straightforward to go through similar steps as we did for Case 1.
Case 3 : b < 1 and s = 1. Define
x(st,tr)(vb, vs) =
∫
[ab,vb]
ybdp¯(b,st)(yb)−
∫
[ab,a¯b]
yb(1− Fstb(yb))dp¯(b,st)(yb)
− b
1− b
∫
[ab,a¯b]
ybp¯(b,tr)(yb)ftrb(yb)dyb +
1
1− bvsp¯(s,tr)(vs)
x(tr,tr)(vb, vs) =vbp¯(b,tr)(vb)
Again, it is straightforward to go through similar steps as we did for Case 1.
32
Case 4 : b = s = 1. This case is trivial. 
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Without loss of generality, assume that the bids of the players
lie in [0, 1].
Case 1 : k = 0 or 1. Suppose k = 0. For all s > 0, the strategic-type buyer strictly prefers
to bid her valuation vb than any other bid in Γ
(k,b,s). If she bids tb > vb, then she trades
with all valuation types of the seller who bid in the interval (vb, tb) and ends up paying a
price greater than her valuation on those trades. Since the trustworthy types bid equal to
their valuation, there exists a positive measure of such trades. The strategic-type buyer is
therefore better off bidding equal to her valuation since this bid only reduces the probability
of trades on which she gets a negative payoff. If she bids tb < vb, then she does not trade
with all valuation types of the seller who bid in the interval (tb, vb) (which is also a set of
positive measure) whereas by bidding equal to her valuation she would have traded with
these valuation types of the trustworthy-type seller without changing the price on any other
trade.
So, from the point of view of the strategic-type seller, the buyer’s bid is uniformly dis-
tributed on [0, 1] since both disposition types of the buyer bid equal to their respective
valuations. Then, it is straightforward to see that the strategic-type seller will bid 1
2
(1+ vs).
Therefore, the ex-ante probability of trade in the event that both players are strategic type
is 1
4
< 9
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. A similar proof works if k = 1.
Case 2 : k ∈ (0, 1). We need a few results before we can prove this part.
Lemma 6.1. In Γ(k,b,s), the equilibrium strategies of the strategic-type players, (σb, σs), are
such that
1. If vb > vˆb, then ∀tb ∈ Supp(σb(vb)) and ∀tˆb ∈ Supp(σb(vˆb)), we have tb ≥ tˆb.
2. If vs < vˆs, then ∀ts ∈ Supp(σs(vs)) and ∀tˆs ∈ Supp(σs(vˆs)), we have ts ≤ tˆs.
33
Proof : Pick a vb > vˆb and let tb ∈ Supp(σb(vb)) and tˆb ∈ Supp(σb(vˆb)). Then the following
inequalities are true:
(1− s)
∫
[ts,tb]
(vb − (ktb + (1− k)ts))dGs + s
∫
[0,tb]
(vb − (ktb + (1− k)vs))dFtrs ≥
(1− s)
∫
[ts,tˆb]
(vb − (ktˆb + (1− k)ts))dGs + s
∫
[0,tˆb]
(vb − (ktˆb + (1− k)vs))dFtrs (4)
(1− )s
∫
[ts,tˆb]
(vˆb − (ktˆb + (1− k)ts))dGs + s
∫
[0,tˆb]
(vˆb − (ktˆb + (1− k)vs))dFtrs ≥
(1− s)
∫
[ts,tb]
(vˆb − (ktb + (1− k)ts))dGs + s
∫
[0,tb]
(vˆb − (ktb + (1− k)vs))dFtrs (5)
Multiplying (5) by −1 and adding it to (4) we get,
(vb − vˆb)((1− s)Gs(tb) + sFtrs(tb)) ≥ (vb − vˆb)((1− s)Gs(tˆb) + sFtrs(tˆb))
Since vb > vˆb, then it must be true that (1−s)Gs(tb)+sFtrs(tb) ≥ (1−s)Gs(tˆb)+sFtrs(tˆb).
Since s > 0 and Gs is non-decreasing and Ftrs is strictly increasing on [0, 1], it must be that
tb ≥ tˆb. 
Definition 6.2. For the bilateral trading problem ((b, s), (Fsti , Ftri)i=b,s)), where Fsti = Ftri
are uniform on [0, 1],∀i, define M(b,s) to be the set of trading outcomes that satisfy IC∗,
IR for the strategic types and
R1
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
x(st,tr)(vb, vs)dvsdvb > 0.
R2
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
x(tr,st)(vb, vs)dvsdvb < 1.
R3 If vb ≥ vs, then p(tr,tr)(vb, vs) = 1; otherwise p(tr,tr)(vb, vs) = 0.
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R4 Define, p¯b(vb) =
∫
[0,1]
p(st,st)(vb, vs) dvs and p¯s(vs) =
∫
[0,1]
p(st,st)(vb, vs) dvb. p¯b(vb) is non-
decreasing and p¯s(vs) is non-increasing.
R5
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
p(st,st)(vb, vs)dvsdvb <
1
2
.
Lemma 6.3. Let M (b,s) ∈M(b,s), where (0, 0) (b, s) (1, 1). There exists (ˆb, ˆs)
(b, s) and an outcome M
(ˆb,ˆs) ∈ M(ˆb,ˆs), such that the ex-ante probability of trade in the
event that both players are strategic is higher in M (ˆb,ˆs) than in M (b,s).
Proof : LetM (b,s) = {(p(st,st), p(st,tr), p(tr,st), p(tr,tr)), (x(st,st), x(st,tr), x(tr,st), x(tr,tr))}. Let U(i,di)(vi)
denote the payoff of player i with type (vi, di) in this trading outcome. Also, let P =∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
p(st,st)(vb, vs)dvsdvb.
Pick (ˆb, ˆs) (b, s) such that
0 <
(1− ˆb)(1− ˆs)bs
(1− b)(1− s)ˆbˆs − 1 <
(
6s
1− s
)∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
x(st,tr)(vb, vs)dvsdvb (6)
Since P < 1
2
(because M (b,s) satisfies R5), we can pick a δ > 0 such that
2P
(
(1− ˆb)(1− ˆs)bs
(1− b)(1− s)ˆbˆs − 1
)
< δ ≤ (1− ˆb)(1− ˆs)bs
(1− b)(1− s)ˆbˆs − 1 (7)
Define the following ∀(vb, vs):
pˆ(st,st)(vb, vs) =
(1− b)(1− s)ˆbˆs
(1− ˆb)(1− ˆs)bs
(
p(st,st)(vb, vs) + δp(tr,tr)(vb, vs)
)
pˆ(st,tr)(vb, vs) =
(1− b)ˆb
(1− ˆb)bp(st,tr)(vb, vs)
pˆ(tr,st)(vb, vs) =
(1− s)ˆs
(1− ˆs)sp(tr,st)(vb, vs)
pˆ(tr,tr)(vb, vs) =p(tr,tr)(vb, vs)
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xˆ(st,st)(vb, vs) =
(1− b)(1− s)ˆbˆs
(1− ˆb)(1− ˆs)bs
(
x(st,st)(vb, vs) + δ
(
v2b − v2s
2
+
1
3
))
xˆ(st,tr)(vb, vs) =
(1− b)ˆb
(1− ˆb)b
(
x(st,tr)(vb, vs)− δ
(
1− s
6s
))
xˆ(tr,st)(vb, vs) =
(1− s)ˆs
(1− ˆs)sx(tr,st)(vb, vs)
xˆ(tr,tr)(vb, vs) =x(tr,tr)(vb, vs),
Note that pˆ(st,st)(vb, vs) ≤ 1 since δ ≤ (1−ˆb)(1−ˆs)bs(1−b)(1−s)ˆbˆs − 1.
LetM (ˆb,ˆs) = {(pˆ(st,st), pˆ(st,tr), pˆ(tr,st), pˆ(tr,tr)), (xˆ(st,st), xˆ(st,tr), xˆ(tr,st), xˆ(tr,tr))}. Let Uˆ(i,di)(vi)
denote the payoff of player i with type (vi, di) in this trading outcome.
For all vb and vs, we now have
¯ˆp(b,st)(vb) =
(1− b)ˆbˆs
(1− ˆb)bs
(
p¯(b,st)(vb) + δ(1− s)vb
)
¯ˆx(b,st)(vb) =
(1− b)ˆbˆs
(1− ˆb)bs
(
x¯(b,st)(vb) + δ(1− s)v
2
b
2
)
¯ˆp(s,st)(vs) =
(1− s)ˆbˆs
(1− ˆs)bs
(
p¯(s,st)(vs) + δ(1− b)(1− vs)
)
¯ˆx(s,st)(vs) =
(1− s)ˆbˆs
(1− ˆs)bs
(
x¯(s,st)(vs) + δ(1− b)
(
1− v2s
2
))
We first check that M (ˆb,ˆs) satisfies IC∗. For all vb and v′b,
vb ¯ˆp(b,st)(vb)− ¯ˆx(b,st)(vb)− vb ¯ˆp(b,st)(v′b) + ¯ˆx(b,st)(v′b)
=
(1− b)ˆbˆs
(1− ˆb)bs
(
vbp¯(b,st)(vb)− x¯(b,st)(vb)− vbp¯(b,st)(v′b) + x¯(b,st)(v′b) +
δ(1− s)
2
(vb − v′b)2
)
≥ 0.
36
Also, for all vs and v
′
s,
¯ˆx(s,st)(vs)− vs ¯ˆp(s,st)(vs)− ¯ˆx(s,st)(v′s) + vs ¯ˆp(s,st)(v′s)
=
(1− s)ˆbˆs
(1− ˆs)bs
(
x¯(s,st)(vs)− vsp¯(s,st)(vs)− x¯(s,st)(v′s) + vsp¯(s,st)(v′s) +
δ(1− b)
2
(vs − v′s)2
)
≥ 0
Next we check that M (ˆb,ˆs) satisfies IR for the strategic types. For all vb, we have
Uˆ(b,st)(vb) =
(1−b)ˆbˆs
(1−ˆb)bs
(
U(b,st)(vb) + δ(1− s)v
2
b
2
)
≥ 0 and for all vs, we have Uˆ(s,st)(vs) =
(1−s)ˆbˆs
(1−ˆs)bs
(
U(s,st)(vb) + δ(1− b) (1−vs)22
)
≥ 0
Now we check that M (ˆb,ˆs) satisfies R1.
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
xˆ(st,tr)(vb, vs)dvsdvb =
(1− b)ˆb
(1− ˆb)b
(∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
x(st,tr)(vb, vs)dvsdvb − δ
(
1− s
6s
))
> 0,
because (6) and (7) imply that δ <
(
6s
1−s
) ∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
x(st,tr)(vb, vs)dvsdvb .
It is straightforward to check that M (ˆb,ˆs) satisfies R2, R3 and R4.
We finally check that M (ˆb,ˆs) satisfies R5.
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
pˆ(st,st)(vb, vs)dvsdvb <
1
2
(1− b)(1− s)ˆbˆs
(1− ˆb)(1− ˆs)bs (1 + δ) ≤
1
2
,
where the first inequality uses the fact that P < 1
2
and the second inequality uses (7).
Therefore, M (ˆb,ˆs) ∈M(ˆb,ˆs).
Lastly, note that
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
pˆ(st,st)(vb, vs)dvsdvb =
(1− b)(1− s)ˆbˆs
(1− ˆb)(1− ˆs)bs
(
P +
δ
2
)
> P,
where the inequality follows from (7). 
Suppose there exists an (b, s) and an equilibrium of Γ
(k,b,s) which has at least as high
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ex-ante probability of trade in the event that both players are strategic than 9
32
. Consider
the outcome of that equilibrium, M (b,s).
Lemma 6.4. M (b,s) ∈M(b,s).
Proof : It is straightforward to check that M (b,s) will satisfy IC∗ and IR for the strategic
types. It must be that a positive measure of valuation types of the strategic-type buyer
submit positive bids. If not, then almost all valuation types of the strategic-type seller will
not trade with the strategic-type buyer because the strategic-type seller who trades with a
positive probability will bid at least as high as her valuation. This would then contradict
the fact that the ex-ante probability of trade among the strategic types is positive. Since a
positive measure of valuation types of the strategic-type buyer bid a positive amount and
the trustworthy-type seller bids equal to her valuation, R1 is satisfied. R2 is satisfied since
k ∈ (0, 1) and the trustworthy-type buyer bids equal to her valuation. R3 is clearly satisfied
since the trustworthy types bid equal to their valuations. R4 follows from Lemma 6.1. All
valuation types of the strategic-type buyer (seller) who are trading with a positive probability
must be bidding at most (least) equal to their respective valuations. Therefore, the ex-ante
probability of trade among the strategic types in M (b,s) cannot be higher than 1
2
. If the
ex-ante probability of trade among the strategic types in M (b,s) is equal to 1
2
, then almost
all valuation types of the strategic type-players must be bidding equal to their respective
valuations. Proposition 4.5 proves that this is impossible and thus, R5 is also satisfied. 
Now, using Lemma 6.3, we can construct a sequence of outcomes,M (
n
b ,
n
s ) ∈M(nb ,ns ) with
1i = i ∀i and (0, 0)  (n+1b , n+1s )  (nb , ns ), such that the ex-ante probability of trade in
the event that both players are strategic type is greater in M (
n+1
b ,
n+1
s ) than in M (
n
b ,
n
s ).
LetM (
n
b ,
n
s ) = {(pn(st,st), pn(st,tr), pn(tr,st), pn(tr,tr)), (xn(st,st), xn(st,tr), xn(tr,st), xn(tr,tr))}. Then it must
be that limn→∞
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
pn(st,st)(vb, vs) dvbdvs >
9
32
. Moreover, since the sequence of these
probabilities is increasing, there exists a N and a small enough φ > 0 such that for all
n ≥ N, ∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
pn(st,st)(vb, vs) dvbdvs ≥ 932 + φ.
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Let X = {(vb, vs) | 0 ≤ vb, vs ≤ 1, 2vb − 2vs − 1 ≥ 0} and IX(vb, vs) be the indicator
function that takes the value 1 in the set X and 0 otherwise. Define the following:
qnθ (vb, vs) =(1− θ)pn(st,st)(vb, vs) + θIX(vb, vs), θ ∈ (0, 1)
q¯n(b,θ)(vb) =
∫
[0,1]
qnθ (vb, vs) dvs
q¯n(s,θ)(vs) =
∫
[0,1]
qnθ (vb, vs) dvb.
Note that,
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
qnθ (vb, vs) dvbdvs =(1− θ)
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
pn(st,st)(vb, vs) dvbdvs + θ
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
IX dvbdvs
=(1− θ)
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
pn(st,st)(vb, vs) dvbdvs +
1
8
θ
Hence there exists a θˆ > 0 such that for all n ≥ N and θ < θˆ, we have
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
qnθ (vb, vs) dvbdvs = (1− θ)
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
pn(st,st)(vb, vs) dvbdvs +
1
8
θ >
9
32
We show that there exists a n∗ ≥ N and θ∗ < θˆ such that q¯n∗(b,θ∗)(vb) is non-decreasing,
q¯n
∗
(s,θ∗)(vs) is non-increasing and
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
(2vb − 2vs − 1)qn∗θ∗ (vb, vs) dvbdvs ≥ 0. Then, My-
erson and Satterthwaite [15, Theorem1] will imply that there exists a x(vb, vs) such that
qn
∗
θ∗ (vb, vs) along with x(vb, vs) is an incentive compatible and individually rational direct
mechanism for the bilateral trading problem in which both players are only strategic type
and the valuations of the players are distributed uniformly and independently on [0, 1].
However,
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
qn
∗
θ∗ (vb, vs) dvbdvs >
9
32
, which will contradict the fact that the outcome of
the C-S equilibrium has the maximum ex-ante probability of trade in that trading problem.
Since M (
n
b ,
n
s ) satisfies R4, p¯nb (vb) is a non-decreasing while p¯
n
s (vs) is non-increasing. This
is sufficient to show that q¯n(b,θ)(vb) is non-decreasing and q¯
n
(s,θ)(vs) is non-increasing for all n
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and θ.
If there exists a nˆ ≥ N such that ∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
(2vb − 2vs − 1)pnˆ(st,st)(vb, vs) dvbdvs ≥ 0, then
take n∗ = nˆ and θ∗ = 0 and we are done.
So suppose that ∀n ≥ N , ∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
(2vb− 2vs− 1)pn(st,st)(vb, vs) dvbdvs < 0. For all n ≥ N ,
define θ(n) to be such that
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
(2vb − 2vs − 1)qnθ(n)(vb, vs)dvbdvs
= (1− θ(n))
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
(2vb − 2vs − 1)pn(st,st)(vb, vs)dvbdvs +
1
24
θ(n) = 0.
SinceM (
n
b ,
n
s ) satisfies IC∗ and IR for the strategic types, we get the following inequality
using (1) in Lemma 2.5:
(1− nb )(1− ns )
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
(2vb − 2vs − 1)pn(st,st)(vb, vs)dvbdvs
+ (1− nb )ns
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
(2vb − vs − 1)pn(st,tr)(vb, vs)dvbdvs
+ (1− ns )nb
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
(vb − 2vs)pn(tr,st)(vb, vs)dvbdvs
+ nb 
n
s
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
(vb − vs)pn(tr,tr)(vb, vs)dvbdvs
≥ nb
∫
[0,1]
Un(b,tr)(vb)dvb + 
n
s
∫
[0,1]
Un(s,tr)(vs)dvs.
If
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
xn(st,tr)(vb, vs)dvsdvb is bounded from below and
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
xn(tr,st)(vb, vs)dvsdvb
is bounded from above, then limn→∞ nb
∫
[0,1]
Un(b,tr)(vb)dvb + 
n
s
∫
[0,1]
Un(s,tr)(vs)dvs ≥ 0. This is
indeed true because of R1 and R2. Thus, taking the limit of the above expression as n→∞,
we get limn→∞
∫
[0,1]
∫
[0,1]
(2vb − 2vs − 1)pn(st,st)(vb, vs)dvbdvs ≥ 0. Therefore, it must be the
case that θ(n) → 0. Now, pick n∗ ≥ N to be such that θ(n∗) < θˆ. Let θ∗ = θ(n∗) and we
are done. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.2: Define the following ∀(vb, vs):
p′(st,st)(vb, vs) =p(st,st)(vb, vs)
p′(st,tr)(vb, vs) =
s(1− ′s)
′s(1− s)
p(st,tr)(vb, vs) ≤ p(st,tr)(vb, vs)
p′(tr,st)(vb, vs) =
b(1− ′b)
′b(1− b)
p(tr,st)(vb, vs) ≤ p(tr,st)(vb, vs)
p′(tr,tr)(vb, vs) =
sb(1− ′b)(1− ′s)
′s
′
b(1− b)(1− s)
p(tr,tr)(vb, vs) ≤ p(tr,tr)(vb, vs)
x′(st,st)(vb, vs) =x(st,st)(vb, vs)
x′(st,tr)(vb, vs) =
s(1− ′s)
′s(1− s)
x(st,tr)(vb, vs)
x′(tr,st)(vb, vs) =
b(1− ′b)
′b(1− b)
x(tr,st)(vb, vs)
x′(tr,tr)(vb, vs) =
sb(1− ′b)(1− ′s)
′s
′
b(1− b)(1− s)
x(tr,tr)(vb, vs)
It follows that
p¯′(s,st)(vs) =(1− ′b)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
p(st,st)(vb, vs)fstbdvb + 
′
b
∫
[ab,a¯b]
b(1− ′b)
′b(1− b)
p(tr,st)(vb, vs)ftrbdvb
=
1− ′b
1− b
(
(1− b)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
p(st,st)(vb, vs)fstbdvb + b
∫
[ab,a¯b]
p(tr,st)(vb, vs)ftrbdvb
)
=
1− ′b
1− b p¯(s,st)(vs).
Similarly, p¯′(b,st)(vb) =
1−′s
1−s p¯(b,st)(vb), x¯
′
(b,st)(vb) =
1−′s
1−s x¯(b,st)(vb) and x¯
′
(s,st)(vs) =
1−′b
1−b x¯(s,st)(vs).
Therefore, U ′(b,st)(vb) =
1−′s
1−sU(b,st)(vb) and U
′
(s,st)(vs) =
1−′b
1−bU(s,st)(vs). Hence, (p
′
(db,ds)
, x′(db,ds))
satisfies IC∗ and IR for the strategic types.
It is straightforward to show that p¯′(i,tr)(vi) =
i(1−′b)(1−′s)
′i(1−b)(1−s) p¯(i,tr)(vi) and x¯
′
(i,tr)(vi) =
i(1−′b)(1−′s)
′i(1−b)(1−s) x¯(i,tr)(vi), i = b, s. Therefore, U
′
(i,tr)(vi) =
i(1−′b)(1−′s)
′i(1−b)(1−s)U(i,tr)(vi). Thus, (p
′
(db,ds)
, x′(db,ds))
also satisfies IR for the trustworthy types.
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Finally, to prove that no strategic type will misreport herself as trustworthy type, note
that for all vb and v
′
b
U ′(b,st)(vb) =
1− ′s
1− sU(b,st)(vb)
≥1− 
′
s
1− s (vbp¯(b,tr)(v
′
b)− x¯(b,tr)(v′b))
=
′b(1− b)
b(1− ′b)
(vbp¯′(b,tr)(v
′
b)− x¯′(b,tr)(v′b))
≥vbp¯′(b,tr)(v′b)− x¯′(b,tr)(v′b),
where the first inequality follows from the assumption that (p(db,ds), x(db,ds)) satisfies IC.
Similarly, it is easy to show that U ′(s,st)(vs) ≥ x¯′(s,tr)(v′s)− vsp¯′(s,tr)(v′s), ∀vs, v′s. 
Proof of Proposition 4.4: It is easy to see that the functions p(st,st), p(st,tr), p(tr,st), p(tr,tr)
satisfying EX are such that p¯(b,st)(vb) is weakly increasing and p¯(s,st)(vs) is weakly decreasing.
Also, EX implies that
p¯(b,st)(vb) =(1− s)
∫
[as,a¯s]
p(st,st)(vb, vs)fstsdvs + s
∫
[as,a¯s]
p(st,tr)(vb, vs)ftrsdvs
=(1− s)Fsts(vb) + sFtrs(vb)
=(1− s)
∫
[as,a¯s]
p(tr,st)(vb, vs)fstsdvs + s
∫
[as,a¯s]
p(tr,tr)(vb, vs)ftrsdvs
=p¯(b,tr)(vb)
Since p¯(b,st)(vb) is weakly increasing, it follows from the definition of integral that ∀vb, v′b
such that v′b < vb,
∫
[ab,vb]
p¯(b,st)(yb)dyb ≥ (vb − v′b)p¯(b,st)(v′b) = (vb − v′b)p¯(b,tr)(v′b)
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and ∀vs, v′s such that v′s > vs,
∫
[vs,a¯s]
p¯(s,st)(ys)dys ≥ (v′s − vs)p¯(s,st)(v′s) = (v′s − vs)p¯(s,tr)(v′s).
Now, only Inequality (2) is left to be checked. If a¯b ≤ as, then the left-hand side of (2)
equals 0 irrespective of the value of b and s. Hence, in this case ψi(i) = 0, ∀ i ∈ [0, 1] and
i = b, s.
So assume that a¯b > as. For the functions satisfying EX, the left-hand side of (2) is
(1− b)(1− s)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,min{vb,a¯s}]
([
vb − 1− Fstb(vb)
fstb(vb)
]
−
[
vs +
Fsts(vs)
fsts(vs)
])
fstsfstbdvsdvb
+ b(1− s)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,min{vb,a¯s}]
(
vb −
[
vs +
Fsts(vs)
fsts(vs)
])
fstsftrbdvsdvb
+ s(1− b)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,min{vb,a¯s}]
([
vb − 1− Fstb(vb)
fstb(vb)
]
− vs
)
ftrsfstbdvsdvb
+ bs
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,min{vb,a¯s}]
(vb − vs)ftrsftrbdvsdvb (8)
Myerson and Satterthwaite [15, pg. 272] showed that
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,min{vb,a¯s}]
([
vb − 1− Fstb(vb)
fstb(vb)
]
−
[
vs +
Fsts(vs)
fsts(vs)
])
fstsfstbdvsdvb
= −
∫
[ab,a¯s]
(1− Fstb(y))Fsts(y)dy
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Similarly, it is easy to show that
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,min{vb,a¯s}]
(
vb −
[
vs +
Fsts(vs)
fsts(vs)
])
fstsftrbdvsdvb
=
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,min{vb,a¯s}]
([
vb − 1− Ftrb(vb)
ftrb(vb)
]
−
[
vs +
Fsts(vs)
fsts(vs)
])
fstsftrbdvsdvb
+
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,min{vb,a¯s}]
(1− Ftrb(vb))fstsdvsdvb
= −
∫
[ab,a¯s]
(1− Ftrb(y))Fsts(y)dy +
∫
[ab,a¯b]
(1− Ftrb(vb))Fsts(vb)dvb
=
∫
[a¯s,a¯b]
(1− Ftrb(y))dy ≥ 0,
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,min{vb,a¯s}]
([
vb − 1− Fstb(vb)
fstb(vb)
]
− vs
)
ftrsfstbdvsdvb =
∫
[as,ab]
Ftrs(y)dy ≥ 0
and
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,min{vb,a¯s}]
(vb − vs)ftrsftrbdvsdvb =
∫
[as,a¯b]
(1− Ftrb(y))Ftrs(y)dy ≥ 0.
Define,
α(st,st) = −
∫
[ab,a¯s]
(1− Fstb(y))Fsts(y)dy
α(st,tr) =
∫
[as,ab]
Ftrs(y)dy
α(tr,st) =
∫
[a¯s,a¯b]
(1− Ftrb(y))dy
α(tr,tr) =
∫
[as,a¯b]
(1− Ftrb(y))Ftrs(y)dy
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Hence (8) can be written as
(1− b)(1− s)α(st,st) + b(1− s)α(tr,st) + (1− b)sα(st,tr) + bsα(tr,tr) (9)
1. a¯s ≤ ab: In this case, α(st,st) ≥ 0 but α(st,tr), α(tr,st) and α(tr,tr) are positive. Thus, the
left-hand side of (2) is positive irrespective of the value of b and s. Therefore, in this case
ψi(i) = 0, ∀ i ∈ [0, 1] and i = b, s.
2. [ab, a¯b] ∩ [as, a¯s] has a non-empty interior: In this case, α(st,st) < 0, α(tr,tr) > 0 and
both α(st,tr) and α(tr,st) are non-negative. Define
ψb(b) = max
{
0,
(1− b)α(st,st) + bα(tr,st)
(1− b)(α(st,st) − α(st,tr)) + b(α(tr,st) − α(tr,tr))
}
Note that
(1−b)α(st,st)+bα(tr,st)
(1−b)(α(st,st)−α(st,tr))+b(α(tr,st)−α(tr,tr)) is a strictly decreasing function of b and 0 <
ψb(0) ≤ 1. Therefore, ψb is weakly decreasing and ψb(b) < 1, ∀ b > 0.
It is easy to check that for any b, the expression in (9) is non-negative for all s ≥ ψb(b).
Also, (ˆb, ˆs) ≥ (b, ψb(b)) =⇒ (ˆb, ˆs) ≥ (ˆb, ψb(ˆb)) and therefore, the expression in (9) is
non-negative for such a (ˆb, ˆs).
Similarly, it is easy to show that
ψs(s) = max
{
0,
(1− s)α(st,st) + sα(st,tr)
(1− s)(α(st,st) − α(tr,st)) + s(α(st,tr) − α(tr,tr))
}
.

Proof of Proposition 4.5: Suppose for some k ∈ [0, 1] and (b, s)  (1, 1), there exists
an equilibrium of the k-double auction that satisfies EX∗. Since the strategic-type buyer
with vb ∈ (as, a¯s) ∩ (ab, a¯b) trades with a positive probability, she is not bidding more than
her valuation. Similarly, the strategic-type seller with vs ∈ (as, a¯s) ∩ (ab, a¯b) is not bidding
less than her valuation. The strategic-type buyer with vb ∈ (as, a¯s) ∩ (ab, a¯b) is also not
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bidding a number less than her valuation with a positive probability because in that case,
with a positive probability, she would not be able to trade with some valuation-types of the
strategic-type seller whose valuations lie in (as, a¯s) ∩ (ab, a¯b) because, as argued above, all
valuation-types of the strategic-type seller with valuations in this interval bid at least equal
to their respective valuations. Similarly, the strategic-type seller with vs ∈ (as, a¯s) ∩ (ab, a¯b)
is not bidding a number more than her valuation with a positive probability. Thus, the
strategic-type player with vi ∈ (as, a¯s) ∩ (ab, a¯b) is bidding equal to her valuation.
Case 1 : k < 1. We provide a contradiction by showing that for the strategic seller with
vs ∈ (as, a¯s) ∩ (ab, a¯b), ∃ts > vs such that the payoff from bidding ts is strictly higher than
the payoff from bidding vs. Consider the difference in these payoffs,
(1− b)
∫
[ts,t¯b]
(ktb + (1− k)ts − vs)dGb + b
∫
[ts,a¯b]
(kvb + (1− k)ts − vs)dFtrb
− (1− b)
∫
(vs,t¯b]
(ktb + (1− k)vs − vs)dGb − b
∫
(vs,a¯b]
(kvb + (1− k)vs − vs)dFtrb
= (1− k)
∫
[ts,t¯′b]
(ts − vs)dG′b − k
∫
(vs,ts)
(tb − vs)dG′b
≥ (ts − vs)
(
(1− k)
∫
[ts,t¯′b]
dG′b − k
∫
(vs,ts)
dG′b
)
,
where G′b(vb) = (1 − b)Gb(vb) + bFtrb(vb) is the distribution of the buyer’s bid and t¯′b =
inf{tb | G′b(tb) = 1}. There must exist a ts > vs such that the last term is positive. If
not, then limts↘vs
(
(1− k) ∫
[ts,t¯′b]
dG′b − k
∫
(vs,ts)
dG′b
)
= (1−k)(1−G′b(vs)) ≤ 0. Then k < 1
implies that G′b(vs) ≥ 1. This is not possible since Ftrb(vs) < 1 because vs ∈ (as, a¯s)∩(ab, a¯b).
Case 2 : k > 0. Like the previous case, we can provide a contradiction by showing that for
the strategic buyer with vb ∈ (as, a¯s)∩ (ab, a¯b), ∃tb < vb such that the payoff from bidding tb
is strictly higher than the payoff from bidding vb. 
Proof of Proposition 4.7: Let (p(db,ds), x(db,ds))db=st,tr; ds=st,tr be a Bayesian-Nash equi-
librium outcome of some k-double auction with any form of pre-play communication that
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satisfies EX. By Lemma 2.5, it must satisfy (1), which can be re-written as,
(1− b)(1− s)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
([
vb − 1− Fstb(vb)
fstb(vb)
]
−
[
vs +
Fsts(vs)
fsts(vs)
])
p(st,st)(vb, vs)fstsfstbdvsdvb
+ b(1− s)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
(
x(tr,st)(vb, vs)−
[
vs +
Fsts(vs)
fsts(vs)
]
p(tr,st)(vb, vs)
)
fstsftrbdvsdvb
+ s(1− b)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
([
vb − 1− Fstb(vb)
fstb(vb)
]
p(st,tr)(vb, vs)− x(st,tr)(vb, vs)
)
ftrsfstbdvsdvb
=(1− b)U(b,st)(ab) + (1− s)U(s,st)(a¯s)
Since the outcome is EX, p(db,ds)(vb, vs) ∈ {0, 1}. Also, a buyer makes a payment to
a seller if and only if they trade, that is, x(db,ds)(vb, vs) = 0 if p(ds,db)(vb, vs) = 0. There-
fore, ∀ (db, ds) and (vb, vs), we have x(db,ds)(vb, vs) = x(db,ds)(vb, vs)p(ds,db)(vb, vs). Finally,
x(tr,st)(vb, vs) ≤ vb and x(st,tr)(vb, vs) ≥ vs. Substituting these in the above equality, we get
(1− b)U(b,st)(ab) + (1− s)U(s,st)(a¯s)
≤ (1− b)(1− s)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
([
vb − 1− Fstb(vb)
fstb(vb)
]
−
[
vs +
Fsts(vs)
fsts(vs)
])
p(st,st)(vb, vs)fstsfstbdvsdvb
+ b(1− s)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
(
vb −
[
vs +
Fsts(vs)
fsts(vs)
])
p(tr,st)(vb, vs)fstsftrbdvsdvb
+ s(1− b)
∫
[ab,a¯b]
∫
[as,a¯s]
([
vb − 1− Fstb(vb)
fstb(vb)
]
− vs
)
p(st,tr)(vb, vs)ftrsfstbdvsdvb
= −(1− b)(1− s)
∫
[ab,a¯s]
(1− Fstb(y))Fsts(y)dy + b(1− s)
∫
[a¯s,a¯b]
(1− Ftrb(y))dy
+ (1− b)s
∫
[as,ab]
Ftrs(y)dy
< 0,
where the second step follows from the fact that the outcome satisfies EX (see proof of
Proposition 4.4) and the final step uses the fact that ab ≤ as and a¯b ≤ a¯b. Therefore, the
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outcome does not satisfy IR.12
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